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Dec. 17th, 2010 01:42 pmHaving compassion is apparently nearly universal, and the exceptions pretty clearly traceable to damage, whether neurological or developmental, but universal compassion is obviously not itself universal. So if the impulse to feel for or with is all we can base personal ethics on, as compared to institutional ethics, how can we condemn anyone for not caring (then acting as though they don't care) about whoever they happen to not care about?
The answer to this, near as I can see, is that though we obviously still have a lot of cultural and probably biological mechanisms for limiting compassion, which presumably served some important purpose in their time, we have as much of a need to justify limitations on our compassion as we have to feel it in the first place. We don't just make a circle around some Us and regard everyone else as an obstacle, we're ready with a story about why we get to. And that story has to make sense to us, and be one we feel can make sense to others.
A huge watershed in anyone's life who makes it to that watershed is the moment when you realize that there's the sense you put together that has no holes in it, or whose holes can be filled by words on the fly, and then there's the much stronger sense that you did not put together but found, and that has no holes at all (though it may have hazings of the whole, may be in one of the many holes that anything may be in). The first gets abandoned for that second wherever possible, and the first is also now categorically distrusted because of one's new knowledge of its terrible inadequacy.
Limitations based on family don't make sense - as compared to reasons why we might be tempted toward such limitings, why they might feel very good. Limitations based on race, sex, nation likewise are seen to be unjustifiable. Species becomes an iffy one, hence the place where the conversation drifts.
There may be a reduction in enthusiasm once one's compassion is forced to widen this far - it may lose in energy what it gains in coverage. But that's arguable. Whereas I don't think you can argue that compassion can be kept narrow without a failure of (now readily available) knowledge.
The answer to this, near as I can see, is that though we obviously still have a lot of cultural and probably biological mechanisms for limiting compassion, which presumably served some important purpose in their time, we have as much of a need to justify limitations on our compassion as we have to feel it in the first place. We don't just make a circle around some Us and regard everyone else as an obstacle, we're ready with a story about why we get to. And that story has to make sense to us, and be one we feel can make sense to others.
A huge watershed in anyone's life who makes it to that watershed is the moment when you realize that there's the sense you put together that has no holes in it, or whose holes can be filled by words on the fly, and then there's the much stronger sense that you did not put together but found, and that has no holes at all (though it may have hazings of the whole, may be in one of the many holes that anything may be in). The first gets abandoned for that second wherever possible, and the first is also now categorically distrusted because of one's new knowledge of its terrible inadequacy.
Limitations based on family don't make sense - as compared to reasons why we might be tempted toward such limitings, why they might feel very good. Limitations based on race, sex, nation likewise are seen to be unjustifiable. Species becomes an iffy one, hence the place where the conversation drifts.
There may be a reduction in enthusiasm once one's compassion is forced to widen this far - it may lose in energy what it gains in coverage. But that's arguable. Whereas I don't think you can argue that compassion can be kept narrow without a failure of (now readily available) knowledge.
