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Mar. 13th, 2005 10:39 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
proximoceptionI'm having trouble with a basic ethical question I thought I'd answered to my satisfaction.
Why should we care about others? Because it rewards us.
What if we feel it does not? It will nonetheless, perhaps indirectly.
What if we find it does not? You will never find that.
But what if? Then you will care about them because you must.
What if we find we must not? You won't because of who you are.
How do you mean? You're what others are, and know it.
We're exactly what they are? No but close enough, you're far more like than unlike.
But isn't it true that similarity is not identity? It is.
Supposing we should value ourselves primarily for what is exclusive to us, such as our first-person qualities, our feeling pain and pleasure directly?
Can't for the life of me remember how I ever tackled that one. Seems like a mortal blow to pure humanism, to a species-wide "we", or any lesser for that matter. One relying on social ties or even empathetic urges proves fragmentary and ephemeral if they too are.
Perhaps the answer is, humanism should be programmed into institutions that serve humans, but not expected of individuals, except as programmed into them in turn by said institutions for their optimal functioning. But is it humane to cram humanity into those it might not make happier? And why should said institutions serve all humans rather than one or some? Because otherwise conflict might be created? But this is just, what, systems analysis. And there are infinite imaginable equilibria, states of no conflict, short of full value-equality of one individual with another in both law and the individual mind.
Notice humanism as I'm defining it is necessary foundation for a lot of other isms, and perhaps for any sane ethical or political enthusiasm.
I think my old answer had something to do with aesthetics, full sympathy with women and men being a more fertile ground for imaginative development than others. But that's not a contagious principle; the only way you could conduct an ethical argument, if you bought that, would be to say, "No, listen, [murderous dictator], you'll be happier and more yourself if you..."
Why should we care about others? Because it rewards us.
What if we feel it does not? It will nonetheless, perhaps indirectly.
What if we find it does not? You will never find that.
But what if? Then you will care about them because you must.
What if we find we must not? You won't because of who you are.
How do you mean? You're what others are, and know it.
We're exactly what they are? No but close enough, you're far more like than unlike.
But isn't it true that similarity is not identity? It is.
Supposing we should value ourselves primarily for what is exclusive to us, such as our first-person qualities, our feeling pain and pleasure directly?
Can't for the life of me remember how I ever tackled that one. Seems like a mortal blow to pure humanism, to a species-wide "we", or any lesser for that matter. One relying on social ties or even empathetic urges proves fragmentary and ephemeral if they too are.
Perhaps the answer is, humanism should be programmed into institutions that serve humans, but not expected of individuals, except as programmed into them in turn by said institutions for their optimal functioning. But is it humane to cram humanity into those it might not make happier? And why should said institutions serve all humans rather than one or some? Because otherwise conflict might be created? But this is just, what, systems analysis. And there are infinite imaginable equilibria, states of no conflict, short of full value-equality of one individual with another in both law and the individual mind.
Notice humanism as I'm defining it is necessary foundation for a lot of other isms, and perhaps for any sane ethical or political enthusiasm.
I think my old answer had something to do with aesthetics, full sympathy with women and men being a more fertile ground for imaginative development than others. But that's not a contagious principle; the only way you could conduct an ethical argument, if you bought that, would be to say, "No, listen, [murderous dictator], you'll be happier and more yourself if you..."
